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ABSTRACT 
Official Military History (OH) is a thorny subject. Despite a century of 
deploying British service personnel to conflicts all over the world, over the 
past 100 years the British government has commissioned very few OHs.3 
Offering an interpretation of military events that is typically based on 
early access to otherwise classified data, OH presents an opportunity for 
the political and military establishment to set out a perspective that aims 
at legitimacy but is typically criticised as being flawed. In this discussion 
paper we present the conflicting pressures and expectations that frame 
the writing of OH and ask whether such an activity will be possible in a 
world after the controversies associated with the Iraq War Inquiry of 
2009-11. 
 
 
Developing a written account of events has always presented challenges for the 
armed forces. Not only are memories clouded by time and circumstance but also, 
even if experiences are recorded accurately, developing accounts into an official 
																																								 																				
1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, 6 July 
2016 (aka the Chilcot Inquiry). Report available here: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/247921/the-report-of-the-iraq-
inquiry_executive-summary.pdf. Accessed 1 January 2017. 
2 Hoskins’ contribution to this article was funded by an Arts and Humanities 
Research Council Research Fellowship: ‘Technologies of memory and archival 
regimes: War diaries after the connective turn’ (ref. AH/L004232/1). 
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position potentially involves allocating approbation and reward for actions taken in 
battle. The armed forces have long recognised the importance of capturing the ebb 
and flow of events so as to generate important insights that may lead to better 
military outcomes. That such an approach might also produce a politics of memory, 
which in turn affects the production of OH, is less readily discussed in a transparent 
manner. 
 
These problems are especially challenging given the cycle time of contemporary news 
media and the apparently growing significance of “fake news” for shaping public 
opinion. Not only is this “fake” material quickly circulated via social media but it also 
takes considerable time to fact check. In these circumstances, the dilemma facing 
those who commission OH is one where the legitimacy of this type of publication is 
quickly undermined by the public who are already predisposed to distrust official 
material. 
 
An Official History is the Services’ official representation of events, derived from 
source material not available to the general public at the time of its writing. It is 
intended to be objective and balanced, enabling them to learn from both successes 
and failures. The tensions noted above, nevertheless, pose a number of questions 
about OH that we seek to address in this paper. 
 
In the first instance it is important to ask how legitimacy in an OH is created. In the 
second, those commissioning OH need to consider the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the length of time that should pass subsequent to an event being 
interrogated and whether this helps or hinders the creation of legitimacy. In this 
respect the notion of ‘historical distance’, as described by Mark Salber Phillips is 
relevant and may manifest itself ‘along a gradient of distances, including proximity or 
immediacy as well as remoteness or detachment’.4 This gradient of historical distance 
in turn is critical for shaping public and political perceptions of the legitimacy or 
otherwise of inquiry work. 
 
Finally, and depending on the answer to question two, there are trade-offs to be 
considered when reflecting on historical distance as it relates to OH. Writing OH 
may be important to the armed forces as it seeks to shape on-going practices or 
have impact on policy and strategy, in which case the OH should be written shortly 
after the events being considered. Alternatively, a longer historical distance may be 
crucial for those seeking closure and or establishing accountability. In this short 
																																								 																				
4 Mark S. Phillips, ‘History, Memory, and Historical Distance’ in Seixas, Peter. (Ed.) 
Theorizing Historical Consciousness, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 
89. 
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review article we seek to explore how these different dimensions evolve relative to 
each other and make suggestions as to how the controversies associated with the 
Iraq War may shape future OH. 
 
Organisational memory and learning lessons 
The function and effects of the various internal and public reviews, inquiries, and 
histories of military action need to be carefully contextualised if OH has any chance 
of being written at all. In this respect, the very belief in inquiry work shaping on-going 
and future practices, policy and strategy is embedded in the common phrase in 
military discourse of ‘learning lessons’. But such a central feature of military progress 
and a critical component of inquiry work – including in the Iraq Inquiry – is actually 
often taken for granted. Consequently the exact process by which organisational 
learning takes place, and equally the reasons for organisational forgetting, is rarely 
made explicit. Similarly, it seems odd that there is no formalised British military 
strategy and a supporting process that draws widely upon theories and studies of 
institutional or organisational memory. 
 
This is even more surprising given that the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) has 
itself developed a useful working definition of organisational memory. Developed by 
what was known as the MOD’s Corporate Memory Branch5, organisational memory 
is defined as, ‘the ability to draw on and use information and knowledge that is 
embedded in people, processes and records. This is comprised of explicit knowledge 
(records and processes) and tacit knowledge (staff knowledge and experience)’.6 The 
key to creating organisational memory according to the MOD was, therefore, related 
to capturing the interplay between people, processes and records in a holistic 
fashion. 
 
Given this definition, then, it is evident that organisational memory directly and 
indirectly shapes the military’s capacity to learn, adapt, and to be more effective in 
combat. More than this, organisational memory also informs the way that acceptable 
and unacceptable norms of behaviour are codified and propagated. One of the 
fundamental errors of the Iraq Inquiry, however, was its failure to grasp the 
significance of the difference in the approaches to organisational memory between 
the British Army as compared to the mostly civilian staffed MOD. In particular, the 
Iraq War demonstrated how a lack of resources dedicated to capturing and 
maintaining explicit and tacit knowledge within the MOD hampered the coordination 
																																								 																				
5 The MOD’s Corporate Memory Branch was dismantled in 2012-13 with those 
parts that dealt with the Army forming a new Army Historical Branch. These changes 
occurred as part of the Lord Levene Reforms.  
6 UK MOD Corporate Memory scoping study 2006.  
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of organisational memory within the British Army. This became very obvious after 
the publication of the Gage Inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa.7 Held in custody by 
the Army in Basra in 2003, Mousa had been subject to intolerable treatment and 
illegal torture and had subsequently died. In his report into the incident Gage noted 
that the British Army had been banned from using five techniques (hooding, white 
noise, sleep deprivation, food deprivation and painful stress positions) on prisoners 
since the Parker Inquiry of 1972. Lacking any significant means for sustaining that 
knowledge within the MOD the notion that these techniques had been prohibited 
had largely been lost.8 Consequently, at the time of the Iraq War there was ‘no 
written policy or doctrine banning the practices’.9 It is fair to say, then, that before 
Baha Mousa, the MOD’s lackadaisical approach to organisational forgetting 
represented something of a ‘corporate failure’.10 
 
Following the Gage Inquiry, however, the MOD’s approach to organisational memory 
improved. This is evident in the 2014 Al-Sweady Public Inquiry that dismissed 
allegations that UK soldiers mistreated and unlawfully killed Iraqis in 2004.11 The 
conscientious effort to put in place the ability to quickly mobilise the Army’s 
organisational memory taking advantage of the Army Historical Branch’s resources 
and expertise has been critical in this respect. Nonetheless, if robust processes are 
to be put in place that consciously balance decisions favouring organisational 
forgetting with those promoting organisational memory then these activities need to 
be sustained for emergent and ongoing campaigns. If managed carefully, not only will 
this help to sustain the Army’s internal, political and public legitimacy it will also help 
the MOD deal with the various of inquiries into the conduct of Britain’s armed 
forces in times of war. 
																																								 																				
7 Sir William Gage, The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, volume 1, 2011. Official 
report available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279190
/1452_i.pdf. Accessed January 1, 2017. 
8 Huw Bennett argues that the process of organizational forgetting was purposeful 
when it came to the five techniques and was not simply a matter of lacking the 
capacity to remember. See Huw Bennett, ‘Baha Mousa and the British Army in Iraq’, 
in Paul Dixon (Ed), Hearts and Minds in British Counter-insurgency, (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). 
9 The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry. 
10 The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry. 
11 Sir Thayne Forbes, The Report of Al Sweeady Inquiry, December 2014. Official 
report available here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388292
/Volume_1_Al_Sweady_Inquiry.pdf. Accessed 1 January 2017. 
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To do this sustainably, however, the MOD needs to recognise that there are at least 
two distinct cultures that shape organisational memory and military strategy, 
reflecting the perspectives of the Services themselves and that of the MOD more 
broadly. In this respect the tensions between these cultures and their modus 
operandi were rendered apparent in evidence given to the Iraq Inquiry. For example, 
Major-general Albert Whitley12 argued: 
 
In WW II when the leaders met they brought along their military Chiefs of 
Staff and planners to prepare options jointly for strategy and strategic 
decisions. There are books and books relating the matters they wrestled 
with - this time most were not even considered. 
 
It should be a duty for political and civil leaders to prepare themselves to 
frame strategic direction. How many of them have read our military 
doctrine, or understood it or even able to define Grand Strategy or 
Strategy? Perhaps there should be study periods or workshops?  
 
MOD is not fit for purpose if that purpose is to equip, prepare and where 
necessary direct national forces at war.13 
 
But a key difference between the various cultures within defence relates to their 
capacity to work historically. This develops out of a number of distinct organisational 
challenges and operations within and between the MOD and the Services and reflects 
modes of working that have very different temporalities. In the case of the Army, for 
example, it is clear that officers and men are highly effective at swift action and 
achieving clear short-term objectives.14 However, it is less effective in medium and 
long-term decision-making. This contrasts with the British Civil Service which 
operates to a much more extended timeframe. The continuity and longevity of the 
archival record of operations that are conducted by the Army is ultimately the 
principal responsibility of the Civil Service. 
 
On top of this, the British Army adopts a policy of limiting an individual’s service time 
																																								 																				
12 Senior British Land Advisor to the Commander the Coalition Forces Land 
Component Command Kuwait and Iraq from November 2002 to May 2003. 
13 Official website of the Iraq Inquiry: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96166/2011-01-25-Statement-Whitley.pdf 
Accessed 1 January 2017. 
14 Anthony King, ‘Unity Is Strength: Staff College and the British Officer Corps’, British 
Journal of Sociology vol. 60, no. 1 (2009). 
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in a role or while on operations via a tour of duty. The notion of a ‘two year tour’ 
was developed to maintain the effectiveness of a fighting force as well as morale 
during times of peace. At the same time by moving officers around the Army it 
became possible to build organisational resilience and provide enough opportunity to 
gain the requisite experience for career progression. The flip side of this mode of 
utilising human resources has been a decline in the continuity of record-keeping for 
an organisation whose records are typically created in different locations across the 
world (in effect, the MOD has many thousands of sites, significantly more than most 
UK government departments). In Iraq, this challenge to organisational memory was 
further constrained by the short tour duties of some civilians, as summarised in the 
conclusions to the Chilcot Report which stated: 
 
The difficult working conditions for civilians in Iraq were reflected in short 
tour lengths and frequent leave breaks. Different departments adopted 
different arrangements throughout the Iraq campaign, leading to concerns 
about breaks in continuity, loss of momentum, lack of institutional memory 
and insufficient local knowledge.15 
 
In evidence given to the Inquiry on 21 July 2010, Lieutenant-general Sir Alistair Irwin 
(Adjutant General from 2003-2005) underlines the challenge of the rapid dissipation 
of Army organisational memory:  
 
in respect of an institution, the only lessons that are learned and put into 
effect are the ones that are put into effect immediately, because the nature 
of an institution, with the individuals in it passing in and out and changing 
jobs and so on, is that unless the lesson is applied immediately, it will never 
be remembered. That's one of the real difficulties about lessons learned.16 
 
By comparison, lengthy periods of fighting focused on one type of war require 
significant organisational relearning when suddenly confronted with another, as with 
the shift to fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan this century, compared with 
the preparations that had been made to engage in conventional combat during, for 
instance, the 1991 Gulf war. Despite the fact that the British had more, and more 
recent, experience than their American counterparts in fighting insurgency style 
																																								 																				
15 Official report of the Iraq inquiry: Section 152, p. 423, para. 86. 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/246651/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry_section-
152.pdf. Accessed 1 January 2017. 
16Official website of the Iraq Inquiry: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95382/2010-07-21-Transcript-Irwin-Palmer-
S3.pdf#search=lessons. Accessed 1 January 2017. 
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warfare in Northern Ireland, the Chilcot Report clearly recognised that the Army’s 
organisational memory had faded quickly. Indeed as Lieutenant-general Jonathon Riley 
describes in his evidence to the Iraq Inquiry on the 14 December 2009: 
 
it was borne in on me very strongly how much the collective experience of 
the army of dealing with the IED threat had wasted out during the long 
period of ceasefire in Northern Ireland. We had forgotten institutionally 
how to deal with this… not just as a series of devices but as a system and 
how to attack the device and attack the system behind it.17 
 
And it is this idea of ‘collective experience’ that could be usefully made more tangible 
through more focused studies of organisational memory that explicitly tracked the 
different forms and temporalities of Army and MOD learning. By making it clear 
when, where and how Army and MOD cultures are in conflict it becomes easier to 
reduce the risks of losing organisational knowledge. 
 
Official History 
In contrast to the more time limited and sometimes opaque workings of 
contemporary organisational memory, the learning or failing to learn military lessons 
in an institutionally sanctioned form was once made visible through the publication of 
official histories. This represented an opportunity for a Department of State to come 
a formal and departmentally agreed position on its role in a particular set of events. 
Such a position would allow the entire organisation to undertake institutional level 
change. As such it demanded a greater deal of scrutiny, objectivity and balance than 
might be found in those modes of organisational learning that demand faster cycle 
times and that are typically associated with military adaptation.18 
 
Nevertheless it can take a considerable amount of effort to produce a report that is 
both balanced and has some capacity to help drive change within and across a 
Department of State. There can be a number of reasons for this but one of the 
essential challenges to overcome relates to the relationship between the author of 
																																								 																				
17 Official website of the Iraq Inquiry: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/236689/2009-12-14-transcript-riley-wall-s2.pdf. 
Accessed 1 January 2017. 
18 There is huge amount of literature on military adaptation. A good example of 
contemporary studies include: Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation 
and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 33, no. 4. (2010); Sergio Catignani, ‘“Getting COIN” at the Tactical Level 
in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-insurgency Adaptation in the British Army’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, (2012). 
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the OH and those who are being observed. Typically OH authors have ‘had access to 
classified official documents and to a variety of authoritative persons, have had 
financial or other support, and that in many cases they have written from within an 
official office’.19 At the same time, however, the proximity to the source material and 
its sponsors opens up the possibility that the authors of OH lack sufficient 
independence to be capable of composing a publication that has the meaningful 
capacity to produce change. 
 
In this respect, one prominent counter-factual test of the potential value of official 
military history lies in the emergence of FCO documents supporting claims of British 
forces’ torture of Kenyan prisoners held during the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s. 
These documents only emerged in 2012 after the British government finally admitted 
their existence during a court case brought by some of the elderly survivors. Known 
as the Hanslope Archive, these records were retained by the FCO for years. Yet 
their rediscovery decades after the Kenya Emergency fuelled widespread claims of a 
government cover-up. Of course if an OH of the Kenya Emergency had been 
sanctioned and had subsequently failed to make use of these FCO documents then it 
would have been hard for the Government to escape the accusation that they had 
attempted a cover-up. However, no OH of the conflict in Kenya was authorised and 
consequently the archive remained hidden.  
 
Such a state of affairs raises questions of policy in relation to OH. Who decides to 
do an OH and what are the conditions imposed on its writing? If an OH is to be of 
any value then its authors have to have access to all the relevant documentary 
evidence. If that had been available in Kenya then it would have enabled the victims’ 
claims to have been properly heard many years earlier: most victims had died before 
the revelations of the 2010s. In principle, this would have protected the British 
government from claims of a conspiracy through the deliberate concealment of 
records and also resolved any outstanding legal and humanitarian concerns. 
 
This counter-factual scenario nevertheless exposes the problems that immediately 
present themselves when thinking about the way that OH is conceived and written. 
As Higham recognises, however, these problems are far from new as in many 
respects, ‘Official history is in itself a contradiction in terms’.20 From the military’s 
standpoint, OHs are not intended as independent or objective but as offering a 
perspective weighted towards the specific records set being used and the privileged 
																																								 																				
19 R. D. S., Higham, ed., Official Histories: Essays and Bibliographies from Around the World. 
Kansas State University Library Bibliography Series. (Manhattan, KS: Kansas State University 
Library, 1970), p. 1. 
20 Higham, Official Histories, p. 1. 
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access being afforded to them. Obviously this is further limited by the military’s 
willingness to sanction an official account that could damage its work or its 
reputation. In this context, OH represents a negotiation between the ambition to 
write a balanced history based on an expert and objective use of sources and the 
immediate demands of the organisation to protect itself from unhelpful scrutiny. 
 
To this end, the principal function of military OH is to provide a sober, well 
researched manuscript which lays out the official version of events and acts as the 
point of departure for academic discussion going forward. Any interpretation and 
critique of events must be based upon high quality evidence and be balanced and 
objective. Securing that objectivity is difficult but important. One common, if 
informal, strategy for attaining greater objectivity involves sharing for comment key 
draft passages with participants in the events being documented, thereby facilitating a 
more negotiated account, although one not usually evident in the final product. In 
this respect there is precedent. 
 
For example, Brigadier-general C.F. Aspinall-Oglander’s (1932) History of the Great 
War: Military Operations GallipoIi (Vol.II) May 1915 to the Evacuation was ‘based on 
official documents by direction of the Historical Section Committee of Imperial 
Defence’.21 A letter from Major-general Sir John Duncan (also serving in the British 
Army in Gallipoli) to General Aspinall dated 15 February 1931 (recently discovered 
by HB(A)) comments on a full draft of this manuscript, recommending a series of 
changes to the text (including some based on his own memories of events of the 
day). In this instance, General Duncan writes: ‘In discussing the operations you have 
naturally found it necessary to criticise individuals. I agree with most of your 
remarks, but it is to me questionable whether it is wise to be quite as frank as you 
have been’. He continues: ‘I think I would omit such a sweeping statement as “there 
can be little doubt that the situation was aggravated by a total absence of higher 
leadership”. There is sufficient in the remainder of the para. to indicate this without 
stating it so brutally and frankly’. 
 
This sentence (along with a numerous others identified by General Duncan) did not 
make their way into the published official history. However, it clearly points to the 
way in which the military themselves seek to moderate OH and demonstrates the 
possibilities and limitations of this form of publication. 
 
																																								 																				
21 C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War: Military Operations GallipoIi (Vol.II) 
May 1915 to the Evacuation, (London: William Heinemann, 1932). 
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Official History after Chilcot 
Bearing all of that in mind, and in light of the controversy associated with the British 
Government’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, there will be a number of 
challenges to overcome before an official history of that conflict is written. The first 
will relate to the amount of time needed to do the research and the timing as to 
when to start and by when to finish. In the past all military official histories have been 
published before the departmental records, which provide the bulk of the evidence 
base, have been opened to the public at the National Archives. This meant that the 
authors had the relative luxury of fifty and more recently thirty years before that 
threshold was reached. Today the release of public records threshold has been 
reduced to twenty years. In theory then, the MOD’s Operation Telic papers will 
begin the transfer to the National Archives in 2023, about six years from now.22  
 
In terms of simple writing time this does not present an insurmountable problem; the 
problem occurs because, depending on the circumstances, it becomes harder to 
write a balanced, complete and objective manuscript when this is done so close to 
the events. So as we have alluded to in the previous sections it is probably necessary 
that the principle military participants are no longer serving and unable to exert any 
influence on the writing of an Iraq campaign history. If they are still serving then it is 
unlikely that an OH would pass even a basic credibility test with the public. At the 
same time of course, it is precisely those who remain in the Service that very much 
need to access recent OH if they are to have a shared and agreed starting place for 
framing future policy. 
 
In terms of time taken, it should be noted that the campaign histories of the Second 
World War were published over 36 years between 1952 and 1988. Nevertheless, in 
light of recent publications (by for example David French, John Buckley, Jonathan 
Fenell, Ian Gooderson and Niall Barr), close examination of these OHs could lead to 
the broad generalisation that the earlier a volume was completed, the less well the 
manuscripts have withstood the test of time.23 And, of course, if an official publication 
cannot withstand the test of time then what would be the point of writing it? Bearing 
																																								 																				
22 As an aside, the Operation Granby papers from 1991 are already being transferred. 
23 David French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 
1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ian Gooderson, A Hard Way to 
Make a War: The Italian Campaign in the Second World War (London: Anova, 2008); 
John Buckley, Monty's Men - the British Army and the Liberation of Europe  (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 2013); Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein  
(London: Pimlico, 2005); Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in The North African 
Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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in mind the ambition to wait until senior personnel have retired combined with the 
challenge of releasing documents after 20 years, 2020 would be the earliest one 
could begin to assume that the principal military actors of Operation Telic were no 
longer be serving. If the ambition is to complete an OH before the records are 
released to the public, then this would leave just a three-year window to fully 
explore a six-year campaign. 
 
Sufficient time will grant the opportunity for greater objectivity and balance. How 
much time writers will have to complete an OH is also a function of the 
circumstances surrounding the subject matter. The war in Iraq is arguably the most 
contentious war that the United Kingdom has ever fought. Other wars (Suez in 1956 
for example) have been divisive at the time and some have been divisive over many 
years (Northern Ireland for example) but no other war can match the 2003 war in 
Iraq for the intensity and endurance of the emotion it still arouses in British society. 
For some conflicts it is simply not possible to achieve the correct perspective and 
detachment until a considerable period of time has passed. Telic is one of those wars 
and the 2016 publication of the Chilcot report demonstrated how raw those 
emotions are thirteen years after the start of the operation and seven years after its 
completion.  
 
Within Whitehall, contention will also lead to delay and distortion of the OH 
publication timeline. Once an OH manuscript has been completed it must be cleared 
by all relevant government departments. This is far from straightforward. A 
prematurely written OH will attract objections and calls for amendments which then 
have to be further negotiated with the author. The clearance process will take longer 
the more contentious a conflict, the closer the writing of the OH is to the event and 
the more government departments there are involved in the process. The Iraq war 
and the campaign in Northern Ireland will be at the far end of this clearance 
timescale.  
 
Other government activity and ongoing litigation will also impede the initiation of an 
official history. It would, for example, have been inconceivable that an Iraq OH could 
command any significant consideration within Whitehall until sometime after the 
publication of Chilcot’s report. Moreover it would not be politically or institutionally 
acceptable for an OH manuscript to disagree with or contradict a Chilcot finding. 
Even after the publication of the Iraq Inquiry government will be occupied with 
absorbing its contents and implementing its recommendations.  
 
Future Official Historians will also face a significant challenge in determining when 
their research is complete. In the past, the author of an OH would have been given 
access to the body of official records. This would have been a carefully structured 
body of paper files containing multiple documents. Whilst there may have been a 
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great deal of them it was possible to assimilate their contents and also browse 
through them as well as the file title. That will no longer be the case. There are likely 
to be relatively few paper files relating to Telic as the majority of records are now 
electronic files containing single documents (e-mails, text documents, presentation 
slides etc.). It is also unlikely that these files will have anything like the structure and 
‘browsability’ of their paper ancestors. Ease of interrogation and analysis will 
therefore depend on the availability of and the ability to use sophisticated data mining 
tools. 
 
Historians also need to consider the impact of the digitisation of military command 
and control which took place in the first decade of the new millennium. This has led 
to a vast increase in the number of electronic files created, further compounded by 
the ever-increasing complexity of modern military operations. Combined, the lack of 
structure and the large number of electronic records will mean that any author will 
have to work far harder (and longer) to come to a meaningful understanding of the 
record set. Analysing the records and working the results into a complete and 
digestible manuscript will likewise be harder than anything which has gone before. It 
may even be the case that the task of writing an OH within a reasonable timeframe 
becomes impossible for a single author to achieve and that the norm will be for a 
team of authors to work on different aspects of the history.  
 
The longer lead times and additional people required to prepare an OH will all add 
up to greater cost at a time when the Government’s finances are precarious. This 
will mean that an activity which is already underfunded is likely to fall even further 
down the resource priority list. The Cabinet Office is responsible for the 
Government’s OH program but it is unclear how active it is and what future plans it 
has for addressing the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
Conclusion 
Official History gains legitimacy when it is balanced and aims at developing an 
objective record of events. Trade offs are inevitable depending on the campaign 
under consideration and the politics of memory associated with that conflict. 
Scrupulous attention and a willingness to write about those campaigns that are 
politically or organisationally contentious is important if the legitimacy of OH as a 
form of publication is to be sustained over the longer term. It is no surprise, 
however, that OH has the potential to open up difficult debates that are impossible 
to resolve satisfactorily for all those involved. In the circumstances, the real indicator 
of the armed forces’ willingness to learn is related to their willingness to ask and then 
answer those questions that might otherwise be taboo or organisationally and 
politically difficult. 
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At its best, then, OH offers an agreed starting place for initiating or framing a wider 
public debate. As we have seen, however, whether OH can do this given the 
challenges associated with writing and releasing a history before classified documents 
are released to the National Archives is another matter. Nevertheless, if OH 
stimulates debate and helps to generate understanding about the armed forces and 
their uses then it will have served a worthwhile social purpose.  
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